indicates. In this respect, I suggest that a contemporary iconography of time provides not only a simple yet rich background for explicating the poem, but also a principle for poetically motivating the temptations. Milton, moreover, may be expected especially to exploit such a set of conventions in a work so fundamentally concerned with history and typology as Paradise Regained. As Laurie Zwicky has convincingly argued, 'the cornerstone of Christ's rejection of the temptations' is precisely his attitude to time, to 'the proper moment,'" in contrast to Satan's importunity.
First, in general tenns, there is a clear opposition throughout Paradise Regained between the Son's and Satan's views on the meaning of time and history. Christ's trust in the 'fullness of time' is contrasted repeatedly to Satan's trust in fortune and chance. The Son interprets time as a Platonic 'image of eternity' in which God's purposes are declared, and through which man will be redeemed in the 'due time' which Christ equates with 'providence." In sum knowledge Christ finds strength to 'endure the time' until 'my season comes,' for he believes 'All things are best fulfill'd in their due time' CIII 182). Without this sense of participation in eternity, time becomes chaos, as it is for Satan. He does not know the meaning of Christ's coming, and consequently is at the mercy of the seemingly random moment that will bring his downfall. Satan's knowledge of the prophecy Cas Milton con6nns in The Christian Doctrine)' serves only to pain him, and his first question to the Son reflects his total point of view: 'Sir, what ill chance hath brought thee to this place?' CI 321). For Satan, time is the realm of 'ill chance,' of fortune, of accident: a category which he attemps to use, explOit, and tum to his own ends. 'But on occasion's forelock watchful wait' CIII 173) is, in this respect, the burden of the tempter's advice to Christ. In the course of Paradise Regained, however, time runs out for Satan, because it has no purpose. His extemporising, like Iago's, confines him increasingly to the urgent cares of the moment and this draws him ever deeper into delusions of a self-sufficiency as meaningless as time itself viewed without the perspectives of providence.
In tenns of commonplace iconography, Satan seems to rely, foolishly, on time the destroyer, while Christ trusts in time the revealer. As Panofsky points out, time the revealer is well known in the Renaissance 'from countless representations of subjects such as Truth revealed or rescued by Time, Virtue vindicated by Time, Innocence justified by Time, and the like.'" On the other hand, time the destroyer, often associated with Saturn who devoured his children, is typically monstrous and self-destructive.' This is the sharp 'tooth of time' of Shakespeare's Measure for Measure ( Milton's early poetry certainly shows his familiarity with these basic conventions," and they are Significantly deployed also in Paradise Lost,'· where prelapsarian time, for example, is presented in the conventional aspect of revealer. Raphael explains to Adam that 'one Almighty is, from whom/All things proceed, and up to him return' (v 469-70), and suggests that, for Adam and Eve, 'Your bodies may at last all tum to spirit/ Improv'd by tract of time' (v 497-8) . On the other hand, time the destroyer is intrOduced with the Fall, through Sin and Death. The Saturnian iconography is clear as Sin addresses Death in Book x, instructing him to 'devour unspar'd: 'whatever thing/the Scythe of Time mows down' (x 605-6). Time with the scythe is allied to the devouring monster, and this monstrous consuming is reproduced also as one of the attributes of Sin in Book n: 'about her middle round: we learn, 'A cry of Hell Hounds never ceasing bark'djWith wide Cerberean mouths full loud' ( n 653-5).
The hounds are begot on Sin by Death, her own son, and they return to her womb 'and howl and gnaw/My Bowels, thir repast' (n 799-800). Here Milton not only envisages the legacy of Sin and Death in terms of time the destroyer but seems also to know the widespread iconogtaphy representing destructive time as a Cerberus figure. A well known example of this convention is in the Practica Musice (1496) of Gafurius, who presents time as both revealer and destroyer, and also as Cerberus."
A celebrated woodcut from the Practica Musice" illustrates the complete scheme. Gafurius shows Apollo enthroned in heaven with his feet resting on the tail of a serpent which is looped to represent eternity. The serpent's body extends from the loop downwards through the spheres, and comes to rest on earth, where the head divides into three. The serpent then becomes a monster, time the destroyer, with the face of a wolf (looking left), of a lion (full face), and of a dog (looking right). The three heads represent time in the three aspects of past, present, and future, and Gafurius equates his three-headed beast specifically with Cerberus," though it derives primarily from the Renaissance icon of a three-headed god from the temple of Serapis in Alexandria. The most influential ancient commentary on this famous EgyptcrHellenic god is that of Macrobius, who explainS the Serapis 'Cerberus' in terms of time: the wolf represents time past, the lion time present, and the dog time future." The point is taken up in Petrarch's Africa, which describes the three heads in some detail, and concludes, concisely, that they 'represent fleeting time,''' both monstrous and destructive.
Yet the three parts of time in Gafurius' woodcut also in a sense 'imitate eternity,' for the monster remains part of the serpent descending from Apollo's feet. Accordingly, the Serapis 'Cerberus' was (however improbably) made subject to widespread interpretation in the Renaissance as an allegory for the intellectual quality of good judgement, or consilium.'· This in turn was connected with the three faces of prudence, each of which, traditionally, represents one of the divisions of time (past, present, and future), while corresponding to the major faculties of the mind (the memory, intellect, and will)." Through prudence and good judgment, therefore, the blandishments of fortune may be resisted, and fleeting time become a revealer of eternity.
From the early period to Paradise Lost, Milton's poetry draws on these traditions, mainly the themes of destruction and revelation, the selfdevouring Cerberus monster, the Saturnian figure, and the unveiler of truth. Milton, moreover, was familiar with Serapis,'· and even if he was not thinking specifically of Gafurius, the Practica Musice proVides a convenient example of the type of synthesis wrought from familiar sources in Boethius, Macrobius, Aquinas, Petrarch, and the Renaissance NeoPlatonists, which is uniquely represented, among Milton's writings, in Paradise Regained, a poem centrally concerned with the meaning of Christ's coming into history in the fullness of time. Certainly, from such a background we can see how readily a structural scheme for Satan's strategy based On time would emerge from the basic opposition in Paradise Regained between the tempter's elaims for fortune, and the Son's trust in providence. We can now consider in more detail the main directions of Satan's approaell.
The challenge to turn stones to bread, with which Satan begins, is, appropriately, separate from the three main groups of temptation which follow. The first temptation, as Miss Pope and others" have pointed out, is of particular significance to Protestant exegetes, and represents a temptation to doubt, not gluttony, as in the main Catholic tradition. Here Satan directly assaults Christ's faith, and this attempt underlies the other temptations from which it remains symbolically apart. In relation to the iconography of time, it is significant that Satan should begin by assaulting Christ's faith, for the true objects of faith, as we shall see, are eternal, not temporal. Satan's assault is therefore logically prior, and preparative, to a series of temptations wrought from within the reahns of time itself. But in the three main groups of temptation, Satan, like the three-headed Cerberus,'o tempts Christ specifically according to the three divisions of time the destroyer, to whose self-devouring ways Satan, ironically, is himself bound. Thus the banquet temptation is a temptation to lust, suggesting the voracious wolf (a common emblem for lust, and often associated with prostitutes)," and is related, as we shal1 see, to time past. The second temptation, the wealth-glory-fame sequence, refers to the future, and in it Satan appeals especial1y to Christ's future need of the power of Parthia, Rome, and Athens. This suggests the sagacious dog, which, Macrobius explains, curiously sniffs the future. 22 The third temptation moves into the poem's immediate present, and Satan, by physical threat, tempts the Son through fear to anger, and then, on the pinnacle, to the related sin of pride. Anger and pride suggest the lion," which symbolizes time present.
There is, moreover, precedent for relating the three temptations themselves to the Boethian model of fortune and providence which provides, as we have seen, the language for one basic confrontation between Satan and Christ. In the fourth poem of the first book of The Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius argues that a man can resist the storms of fortune, and the fourteenth-century commentator, Nicholas Trivet, explains the passage in these terms:
First of all it is to be observed that the persecution of the wicked is designated in three ways, that is, by the rage of the sea, by the eruption of a certain mountain, and by the stroke of lightning. The reason for this is that the proud are found in three species according to the three kinds of sin which occupy the world as in 1 John 2: 16: 'For all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.' Certain of the wicked are therefore lecherous, whose persecution is designated by the raging of the sea .. , others, indeed, are avaricious whose persecution is designated by the lire from mount Vesuvius ... others are the proud whose persecution is designated by the flash of Iightning. 24 The three sins, of concupiscence, curiosity, and pride, are clearly associated with the temptations of fortune. Traditional1y, these sins also typify the original temptations of Adam which are, in the fullness of time, endured again by the second Adam, Christ." Milton himself cal1s our attention on numerous occasions throughout Paradise Regained to the typological identity between Christ and Adam. In a scheme apparently so exhaustive as the one we are suggesting for the subsequent temptations, the stones-to-bread episode may at first appear extraneous. But Milton, clearly, must not depart by omission from the Biblical account. Also, he would no doubt prefer, as we have suggested, to follow the Protestant exegesis and interpret the temptation as doubt, not gluttony, and thereby emphasise the typically Reformation importance attached to faith. Yet these choices were no mere capitulations to convention: the stones-to-bread temptation, as we shall see, would be particularly unsuited for presenting gluttony in terms of the temporal scheme which underlies the poem. Nor is the stones-to-bread episode in itself unfunctional: Satan begins by attacking Christ's faith for very good reason. As Milton indicates in Paradise Lost, a testing of faith is at the basis of every temptation: Adam tells Eve that she is 'not proof/Against temptation: because 'Not incorruptible of Faith' (IX 298-9). The tree, for Adam and Eve, was the pledge of obedience and faith (VIII 325), and with the breaking of faith, time as we know it came into the world. The test of faith is the key also to the fall of the angels, who 'first broke peace in Heav'n, and Faith' (n 690). Consequently Christ, the second Adam, 'came to preach eternal life by faith only."7 All temptations, whether of angels or men, therefore, presuppose the corruptibility of faith, and Milton makes an important but commonplace distinction between 'Historical' or Temporal' faith, which is emphatically limited in efficacy, and true 'saving faith' which subsumes temporal COncerns and relates wholly to 'etemallife.'2' Milton is here drawing a distinction which occurs in the broadest spectrum of Christian thought from Augustine to Aquinas and Calvin. Augustine, who asserts that faith has for its object eternal truth and 'things not seen: nonetheless points out that faith 'is concerned with the past, the present, and the future, all three.'" Faith transcends temporal concerns, and also subsumes t11em. Granted, then, that Satan does assault Christ's faith in the first temptation (and here tbe evidence of Pope and Lewalski seems convincing), it would appear that the tempter is simply working to spare himself the effort of plyjng further temptations from within the specific divisions of time. He offers first a logically prior temptation which subsumes these divisions, and which, for the purposes of the poem, also serves to introduce them. An 'over-tost faith: Milton tells us, leads to 'mutin against divine providence."· Having failed against providence in general, Satan now turns to time in particular.
There may be some difficulty for modern readers in appreciating how the temptation of lust involves time past. But the special association of sensuality with memory is a commonplace theme in mediaeval and Renaissance literature, and the peculiar presentation of the banquet temptation in Paradise Regained strongly suggests that Milton was thinking of this connection_ The most inBuential, and universally read, source treatment of the faculties of mind, and particularly memory, in relation to the divisions of time is the CO<nfessions of St Augustine. For Augustine the soul itself is the measure of time. Strictly speaking, time past and time future do not exist, for 'they are not there as future, or past, but present:·' Consequently, memory brings things that have passed to present attention, and expectation leads to 'fore thinking' of the future, but 'that forethinking is present:· 2 Therefore, Augustine concludes, there is 'a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future:" Milton affirms the Augustinian theory in his Logic, where he defines time as '[present] duration of things past, present, and future:" Throughout the Confessions these three aspects of time are further related to the three key sins indicated by I John: the lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and pride.·' They are, in Augustine's language, the sins of concupiscence, curiosity, and pride, the sins by which both Adam and Christ were tempted. Concupiscence, then, is in one special sense related to the 'present of things past: and is a sin associated with memory. The psychology of this is explained by Augustine's treatment of sensuality, and of the function of reason in carnal temptation. First of all, the things of the flesh are in themselves good, 'for the Besh lusts after nothing save through the soul:" Augustine quotes Paul that 'sin reigneth not in our mortal body' but the consent 'unto suggestions that meet him of each several thing that is seen' is what 'defileCs) the man:· 1 The entire stress is on 'consent of the mind' to the suggestions of sensuality. Ideally, 'our very thought itself, although in a certain way it be touched by their suggestion ... turns away ... that it receive not delight ... that men abide not in them:·· In this sense, temptation to lust will succeed if it can cause the mind to dwell on a phantasm which is made present through memory. The man 'who has seen a WOman to lust after her: says Augustine, 'has let his thoughts dwell on her with more pleasure than was right:" A further complication is introduced by the fact that thought itself, in Augustine's theory, is actually formed through memory, as we are led 'by means of outward sensible things which are seen by the eyes of the flesh"· to reasoning. The act of knowing itself involves the past: images are impressed on the memory, and 'when the look has been turned upon those by recollection:" the will joins the two. These and other things of the kind: Augustine assures us, 'have their proper order in time, and in that order we discerned more easily a trinity of memory, sight, and love.''' Memory, then, is the faculty of mind which, in the act of knowing, refers the phantasm, drawn from the senses, to the reason, and allows the mind to remember, and not lose, itself in the act of knowing. Also, more obviously, as we have seen, it permits us to recollect experiences from our past to our present attention, thus becoming a 'present of things past. ' Temptation to lust, therefore, operates in two ways in relation to memory. First, in the act of knowing, the phantasm can so overwhelm the mind that it forgets itself, and this is surely the source, in a literature deriving from such conventions," of those endless parodies of Petrarchan lovers, wandering forgetful, as they do throughout Renaissance letters, distraught, and with their garters loose. It is the source too, on another level, of the tragic dementia of an Othello, who, tempted to lustful jealousy almost wholly in terms of things past, falls into an epileptic fit, symbol of his mind's self-forgetfulness.
No less important as a literary motif is the second process, that of delighting in the sense experience, just glimpsed, and then recollected. This is minutely observed, for example, by Chaucer in his Troilus, who languishes over a memory of the glimpsed Criseyde, as does Petrarch, initially, over Laura. Andreas Capellanus talks for all the lovers in this tradition: 'love is a certain inborn suffering [passio 1 derived from the sight of and excessive meditation upon the beauty of the opposite sex, which causes one to wish above all things the embraces of the other.'" The whole procedure, as D.W. Robertson remarks, 'involves three steps: suggestion, delightful thought, and consent or passion,''' and this is precisely the recollection of the phantasm we have described from Augustine. Certainly Erasmus, writing against the 'filthy sensuality''' of lustful temptation, makes it very clear that memory is the key to the Christian soldier's defence. 'Remind yourself,''' he exhorts, of the cares lust brings with it, 'recall" · those friends who died suddenly, 'remember'" hellfire, 'recoIled'· the love of Christ, 'recall'51 the blessings of Christ. Remember yourself, he advises, and do not dwell On the recollections of illicit sensual suggestions.
In Paradise Regained, Satan's banquet temptation fits perfectly into this general scheme. In fact, only by appealing to such conventions can we make full sense of Milton's peculiar presentation of the feast in the desert. Even before it begins, Belial, talking of women, draws our attention to the traditional ways in which the lures of the flesh act upon men. The mind remembering the phantasm, as Belial well knows, is the source of the sin, and in this circumstance men 'with voluptuous hope dissolve' (II 165) and fall 'with credulous desire' (n 166). Satan makes the sequence clear:
Beauty stands In th' admiration only of weak minds Led captive; cease to admire, and all her Plumes Fallllat and shrink into a trivial toy. [II 220 -3] Again, the delightful thought, the 'admiring,' leads men's minds captive rather than the senses themselves.
Satan, however, is not at all sure that Christ will fall for such a specific temptation as Belial suggests. The approach is too simple, for it is limited to one sensual lure. Satan, more guileful, and not knowing his opponent's specific weakness, prefers to present a banquet with an entire gamut of sensual temptation -food, wine, music, perfume, women, and 'stripling youths' (II 352). Yet Milton's presentation of these sensual lures is curious, and oddly indefinite. We read of 'Beasts of chase or Fowl of game' (n 342: my emphases) built in pastry 'or from the spit, or boil'd' (II 343). There are fish 'from sea or shore' (II 344) ' How we are to envisage all these alternatives as part of a sensual temptation, actually presented, is not clear unless we assume that this sensuality is deliberately phantasmagoric. As we read these lines, we are really invited to recall, with Christ, the various centres of sensual attraction present, as Augustine would say, in the recesses of our memories. Since Satan is unsure of Christ's vulnerability to sensual temptation, he evokes the range of what Christ (and the reader) might remember as sensually exciting. Satan's task then is, according to the paradigm, to make Christ take 'delightful thought' upon the phantasm. Milton indicates this further process by calling attention to the time sequence -'Such was the Splendor, and the Tempter now/His invitation earnestly renew'd' (II 366-7) . Satan 'now' attempts to have Christ think about the pleasures which might appeal to him through memoty, and Christ rejects them as simply phantasms or 'guiles' (n 391), which could become significant for Satan's purposes only by Christ recalling them to mind and yielding, as Satan says 'all thy heart' (II 410). This entire first temptation to concupiscence, then, is associated, through a traditional psychology of recollection, with time past, or more correctly, with that 'present of things past' in the mind. The allied theme of self-forgetfulness is also represented, as Satan, under the guise of challenging Christ to remember and define his identity as Son of God, in fact urges him to forget his Sonship and relinquish the responsibilities consequent upon that identity." Finally, the logic of placing the banquet temptation (which is, after all, Milton's innovation) at this point in the poem becomes more clear by contrast with Satan's certain emphasis in the next assault on Christ, to which we now turn. The relatively elusive psychology of the 'present of things past' achieves more plain Significance in the coherency of the total argument of which it forms a part.
The second group of temptations, the wealth-glory-fame sequence, fits more obviously the divisions of time which we are examining. Here Satan refers consistently to time future, and his appeal is specifically to Christ's coming need, for his Kingdom, of the power of Rome, Parthia, and Athens. This entire temptation would correspond to the 'present of things future: the dog of the Serapis figure which curiously sniffs at what lies ahead. Satan, characteristically, promises Christ that 'Fortune is in my hand' (n 429) as he turns his attention to this next main division of time. 'If at great things thou wouldst arrive: he urges, 'Get Riches first, get Wealth, and Treasure heap' (II 426-7). Admittedly, Satan invites Christ to recall the past glOries of David and Maccabaeus, of Scipio, Pompey, and Julius Caesar, but all to the express end, 'So shalt thou best fullfil, best verify I The prophets old' (III 177-8).
The ensuing panoramas conjured by Satan are also plainly directed at stimulating Christ's curiosity about events of the future, and of rousing him to seize occasion's forelock and glOrify himself by earthly fame which the future promises. Since Christ's Kingdom is 'foretold' (III 551) the Son must strive to bring the prediction about, or else, 'Thou never shalt obtain' (m 554). Satan also assures Christ that he is 'worthiest' and 'shouldst be' (III 226) a king. '1 will bring thee' (Ill 244) he claims, to 'Empires, and Monarchs, and thir radiant Courts' (m 237). ' ('v 221-2 ). How will Christ rule in the new Kingdom, he enquires, without learning: 'How wilt thou reaSOn with them, how refute/Thir Idolisms, Traditions, Paradoxes?' (IV 233-4). In the schools of the ancient world, 'thou shalt hear and learn the secret power' (IV 254), and 'These rules will render thee a King complete' (IV 283). Christ's rebuttal to the series, though issuing from his opposite position of prudent trust in the Father's providence, centres also on the future: 'And of my Kingdom there shall be no end' (IV 151), for, as he says, 'I endure the time' (IV 174).
Having assaulted Christ from the points of view of time past and time future, Satan moves, in the final group of temptations, dramatically into the poem's present. He buffets Christ with a storm and places him on the pinnacle. The temptation has been variously interpreted,"' but it seems less likely that the main aim of the storm is simply to cause Christ to trust fearfully in Satan, than to move Christ, through fear, to anger, symbolised by the storm itself. In the storm, however, Satan certainly does attempt to terrify Christ -the tempest is raised 'to tempt the Son of God with terrors dire' ('v 431). But the operative word is 'with,' which implies instrumentality. The storm is a means to an end, and through fear Satan hopes to move Christ to the sin which ironically redounds (as usual) upon the tempter's own head: Satan, foiled, can only 'vent his rage' (IV 445). The second time 'terror' is mentioned in relation to the storm, the pattern is repeated, as 'the fiend now swoln with rage' ('v 499) attempts to reply to Christ. Fear, in short, is a means of tempting Christ to unjust anger, or rage.
In The Christian Doctrine Milton describes the human affections and lists fear and anger together." They were, therefore, readily associated in his mind, and in a further analysis Milton differentiates between devout fear of God and mere carnal fear which leads to anger and tyranny. In Eilwnoklastes, Milton accuses Charles I of fearing men more than God." He distinguishes the king's 'terrible ague' of fear from the 'wise fear' of the parliamentarians, and claims that the king's fear led directly to 'vehemence,' 'hatred,' and 'revenge.''' By attempting to terrify Christ, Satan hopes to effect a similar reaction, and thus to drive the Son through fear, to 'vehemence,' 'revenge,' and 'rage.' Interestingly, when Satan describes the storm, he compares it to 'turbulencies in the affairs of men' (IV 462) perhaps suggesting that Milton was thinking of the argument from Eikonoklastes, of political fear breeding vengeful anger.
The antidote to anger, as Milton also makes clear in The Christian Doctrine, is 'patience and long suffering,'"' and Christ's reaction to the storm stresses exactly these qualities. Christ is the 'patient' (IV 420) Son of God, who maintains in face of terror a 'calm and sinless peace' (IV 425).
This would again suggest that the storm is an instrument to tempt Christ not simply to fear, but to anger.
The ways in which anger relates to pride, the final temptation on the pinnacle, are conventional. Both anger and pride are traditionally sins of the irascible faculty,·· and anger is a manifestation of pride. St Augustine's sermon on the Lord's Prayer prOvides a useful illustration. Augustine has dealt with the devil's three temptations, the first to lust (where a person 'has let his thoughts dwell' on a phantasm 'with more pleasure than was right'),·· the next to 'hope of gain,'"· and the third toa temptation of which Augustine asks: What then is that frightful temptation ... that grievous, that tremendous temptation, which must be avoided with all our strength?'61 His answer is anger, because it pridefully usurps God's justice, and because it precludes a man from saying, 'Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors,'"2 When that power is lost,' Augustine claims, 'all sins will be retained; nothing at all is remitted,''' Here, again, are the three temptations, and Augustine centres on anger as the most important. It is the sin associated with pride, the present, and, by analogy, with Satan's final temptations to Christ in the storm and on the pinnacle where, as interpreters of the poem have amply illustrated, the Son is tempted to 'vainglory,''' To summarise: in Paradise Regained Milton seems espeCially interested in presenting the meaning of the Sonship in terms of Christ's interpretations of the achievements of men in time, specifically represented by human history, and presented by Satan in the series of panoramas of man's historical achievements: Parthian might, Roman justice, Greek learning, Hebrew prophecy, and kingship. Christ, by interpreting history 'redeems the time' (Eph. 5:15-17), and consequently endows it with meaning.
Christ is the person (as Satan learns) before whom you most fully discover, in time, who you are. In a poem so deeply concerned with such meanings, and also so coolly articulated and severely disciplined I suggest that a principle of organization which is itself simple and yet closely integrated with the poem's central concern with time deserves consideration as an underlying plan deliberately adapted by the poet. Such a plan is implicit in the arrangement of the temptations to correspond first to faith which 'is concerned with the past, the present, and the future, all three,' and then with each of these temporal divisions in turn.
Nor are these concerns without precedent in Milton's work. The confrontation between Satan and Christ in terms of fortune and prOVidence can be associated, through Milton's early writing, with the conventional imagery of time the destroyer and time the revealer. Milton also shows interest in destructive time as a Cerberus figure, the three heads of which, in terms of a further Renaissance tradition involving the Serapis 'Cerberus' iconography, represent time as the wolf (past), lion (present), and dog (future). The Boethian fortune, on which Satan clearly relies in Paradise Regained, is readily associated also with the three temptations of Adam and Christ, and it seems plain, in a poem so concerned with typology, history, and time, that Milton has, on one level, arranged the temptation of the Son in terms of these Renaissance conventions for representing time. He uses the themes of fortune and proVidence, of revelation and destruction, and the main divisions of time itself; the past, future, and present, which correspond to memory, intellect, and will, and the three sins of lust, curiosity, and anger (pride). But lest this analysis appear arbitrary, one striking analogue to the structure of Milton's poem will prOvide a conclusion to the argument.
The tapestry known as The Vindication of Innocence, by Giovanni
Rost, based on Angelo Bronzino, and at present in the Galleria degli Arrazzi in Florence, shows Justice, bearing a sword and scales, rescuing Innocence from a serpent, a wolf, a lion, and a dog."' In the background, the figure of an old man, Winged, and with an hourglass, unveils a girl. He represents Time (without his scythe or other destructive aspects), unveiling Truth, as Innocence is rescued by Justice from the sins of the world. Panofsky points out that the attitude of Justice is that of Christ rescuing souls from Hell, and, using Ripa, he interprets the animals as anger (lion), perfidy (serpent), greed (wolf), and envy (dog)." But, it might nOW be suggested, since Justice, in the attitude of Christ, is about to slay specifically the serpent, that the serpent is Satan, and the three emblematic animals represent time without truth -the past, present, and future with their three sins of lust, anger, and curiosity. Just as the stones-ta-bread temptation underlies the others in Paradise Regained and remains symbolically apart, so, in the tapestry, the serpent (Satan) alone rears up against Justice (Christ), and remains apart from the wolf, lion, and dog. So also, in the tapestry, as Christ confronts Satan, the figure of Innocence is caught between time the unveiler of truth and time the destroyer, just as the reader is caught in the final two books of Paradise Lost, and just as are the diSciples in Paradise Regained. And, significantly, the diSciples, our human reference point in Milton's brief epic, express their human doubt in terms of the major attitudes to time which this essay began by noticing. As they 'Began to doubt, and doubted many days' (n II), they are caught between
